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Abstract
Return Migration as an
Individual's Optimal Utility Maximizing Behavior
By
Yang Li and Wallace Huffman
The paper presents a model of location behavior ofa multi-period finite-life utility
maximizing individual who consumes leisure, purchased goods, and local amenities and
is retired in the final period of life andempirical evidence from a hazard rate analysis
using micro-data on return migration for ^erto Rican bom males who worked in the
United States during the 1980s. An individual is modeled as considers staying in his
home country or migrating to a hostcountry. We show that it is optimal to migrate in the
first periodor to stay at in the homecountry. Given that migration occurs, return
migration is likelywhenan individual retires. Thereason is local amenities, including
nearness to family, friendly culture, please climate, and familiar places, which are
complementary with leisure, weigh heavily in consumption decisions at this time. In the
hazard rate analysis, we find that factors affectingwage differentials between the United
States and Puerto play a role, but the strongly convex effect ofan individual's age on the
hazard rate for return migration supports the hypothesis ofreturning home in retirement
to consume home-country amenities. However, the hazard ofreturn migration is concave
duration dependent.
Key words: Migration, return migration. United States, Puerto Rico, hazard functions,
local amenities.
12-31-00
Return Migration as an Individual's Optimal
Utility iVlaximizing Behavior
• " ' " ' by
Yang Li and Wallace E. Huffman
Large relatively nev^^ countries like the United States, Canada, and Australia were
settled by immigrants, and immigrants and their off-springs worked to develop these
countries into leadingworld powers. Also, the United States has a long history of
temporaryworker programs, e.g., the bracero programof 1942-1964, and more recently
theH-2Aand H-IB programs. Illegal or undocumented immigration hasbeen a growing
problem in theU.S. since the termination of the bracero program because migration of
Mexican workers did not end. This was highlighted bytheattempts bytheImmigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986 to offer one-time amnesty to illegal workers who could
document their past U.S. work history and hopes ofending illegal immigration (Fix and
Passel 1994). InWestern Europe, net emigration has been the experience until recently,
when legal and illegal immigrants have come from NorthernAfrica and Central and
Eastern Europe to provide significant short and intermediate term increases in the labor
force. Currently about 8.5 percent ofthe U.S. population is foreign bom (Passel and
Edmonston 1994, pp. 37), but it is significantly higher in Canada, Switzerland, and
France.
The authors are Associate Professor ofInternational Business Studies at National Chi-Nan University
Taiw^ and Professor ofEconomics at Id^State University: Helpful comments were obtained
from Peter Orazem and others. Financial assistance from the Iowa Agriculture and Home Economics
Expermient Station is gratefully acknowledged.
Not all immigrationis permanent; a significant share of migrants return home and
a small share goes elsewhere. Some immigrant workers are under contracts that stipulate
the length of their stay, e.g., U.S. H-2A and H-IB workers, and others leave voluntarily.
Most of the earlier studies ofmigration have modeled location choice or migratory
behavior as determined exclusively by income or real wage differences between the home
and host country, possibly incorporating selectivity, for example, see Schwartz (1976),
Boijas (1994), Lalonde and Topel (1997), Borjas and Bratsberg (1996), Stark,
Helmenstein, and Yegorov (1997), Enchautegui (1993), Reagan and Olsen (2000). It has
been unusual to emphasize local amenities, consumption opportunities in retirement or
fmite life in models ofmigration or return migration. However, given the reality of finite
life, retirement is an inevitable event for most males, and it represents a dramatic
behavioral change where future wage prospects are greatly de-emphasized and
consumption opportunities, including easy access to family, friends, familiar places,
comfortable climate, and a friendly culture, weigh heavily on choices. When previous
studies ofmigration and re-migration ignored the importance of retirement on an
individual's location decisions, they over-emphasized wageor earning differentials
betweenhomeand host countries and unemployment for explaining migration and return
migration.
The objectives of this paper are to present a model of location behavior of a multi-
period finite-life utility maximizing individual who consumes leisure, purchased goods,
and local amenitiesand is retired in the final period of life and to present empirical
evidence from a test using micro-data on return migration for Puerto Rican bom males
who worked in the United States during the 1980s, Because the move is one ofmore than
1,000 miles, we aremodeling longdistance migration. Thebehavioral model is one of
sequential optimization,-return migration is conditional behavior, anda hazard ratemodel
of return migrationprovides the logical econometric framework for carryingout these
tests. We find strong empirical evidence for our theoretical model. Factors affecting
wage differentials between the United States and Puerto^Rico play a role but the strongly
convex effect of an individual's age on the hazard rate for return migration supports the
hypothesis ofreturning home in retirement to consume home-country amenities. The
paper unfolds in the following sections.
A Multi-Period Finite-Life Utility Maximizing Model
ofMigration and Re-Migration
In this section, a multi-period fmite-life model ofmigration and^re-migration
decisions of a utility maximizing individual who is bornin,a particular (home) country
and contemplates migration to another (host) .country with theprospect of either staying
permanently in the host country or returning to the home country. Migrantsmay have a
definite long-term location plan as they embark ona sojourn to a host country, e.g., to
work for a few years, save at an unusually high wage rate, and return tothe home country
to enjoy especially high purchasing power oftheir savings (see Stark etd. 1997).
However, migrants, even those with strong ethnic/family transnational networks, face
considerable uncertainty or imperfect inforrnatipn about future economic events in the
host country, e.g., employment, wage rates, and utility generated from consuming
unfamiliar culture, climate, and places in ahost country. Culture, topography (sea coast,
mountains, plains), climate, and environmental quality in apotential host country are
experience good," wluch can only be accurately assessed by sampling therh. Returning
home may be particularly attractive ifthe migrant experiences unanticipated
unemployment in the host country or as he approaches retirement from the labor force
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and expects to find home country culture, places, relatives, and friends complementary
with increased leisure.
An individual's lifetime is split into five periods, and he retires at the beginning of
the last period. Lifetime utility maximization is described as sequential decision-making
over a five-period planninghorizon. Utility is a function ofan individual's leisure time,
purchased goods, and local amenities. The latteris not a choice at the margin, but is an
indicator of location-specific culture, social andpolitical structure, linguistics, distance to
relatives, climate, and environmental conditions that affect the translation of leisure and
goods into satisfaction. To simplify the decision problem in a plausible way, we assume
the individual has full information about his home country, but incomplete information
about the host country, and he can become well or at least better informed only by
spending some timeliving in thehost country. The optimal location strategy for the
individual at each decision timepoint is to choose the country that provides him/her the
greater expected utility over the remaining lifetime.
The Framework
The individual's, potential migrant's, objective is to choose a place to live in each
period in order to maximize his expected present value of utility over the remaining life
span, discounted to the present at a constant discount ratep e (0, 1). Therefore, the
action space isgiven byA= {h,f}, where h = home country,/= host (orforeign)
country. Lets/?) represent thestate of information about countryj inperiod t for j =h,f
and
t= 1,2,...,5. The state space for the decision process is then given by
w . 1 • . . j •S:=S'!xS^ • . ,
Where "x" is the Cartesian product, and the'state space of counti^y, S-', is a subset of
some finite or infinite dimensional vector space depending on the economic
interpretation. Assume the state space S is a complete, separable'metric "space. Given a
state of information s(f) g S at decision time points, which describes the state of
information for both countries, the potential migrant will take an action in A according to
a decision rule. Then, the state of information s{t) might change from period t to period t
+ 1 according to a stochastic ti*ansition law, and the individual takes another action inA
based on the state of informations(t +1).
' Assume the state of information for the two countries changes from one period to
another according to a Markovian decision process. In other words, the stochastic law
ofmotion is given by asequence oftransition probabilities {p, ( • , where
Pt(5 Is, a{sy) denotes the probability that the'state ofinformation is 5'e 5(5/ during
period t, provided the system is'inthe state of information j g S during period / - 1 and
action a(s) g A has been taken during this period. Since the state transition probability is
primarily based on subjective probability assessments of a potential migrant, ifseems
reasonable to assume that only the state of information about the countryj where the
individual currently resides changes and he/she gains no information about another
country. Assuming ahomogeneous Markov process (the time index t can be omitted),
say P(• I•) and P : S -^P (S) is continuous w.r.t. the weak topology on P(S) where P(S)
denotes the set ofall probability measures on the measurable space (S, i?(s)).
Both pecuniary and amenity dimensions ofa location are key factors influencing
the individual's location/migration decision. Assume the state of information on country
j (without uncertainty) in period t can be represented by the real wage rate, denoted by Wj,
and amenities, denoted by Xj. For simplicity, assume that local amenities can be
measured inwageunits andthat the stateof information of countryj for the fifth period
only depends on amenities. Therefore, the stateof information for countryj (without
uncertainty) at time t can be represented by the vector
Sj{t) =
R^xR for t = 1,2,3,4
X . & R fot / = 5
y
Because of uncertainty about future outcome states, the potential migrant will be
modeled as the agent who gathers information and then makes the decision between the
location/migration options. Let Uj .Sj-^R represent the individual preferences about the
possible outcome states ^^(0 in countryj. This specification implies thatthe potential
migrant may feel differently in different countries. If the stateof information s^(t) is a
probability distribution over (wy, Xj), a nature candidate for the per period utility function
over the states in countryj is von Neumann-Morgenstem expected utility
U(w.,x^)ds-(t) (1)
A
where U{) is the indirect utility function over wage rates and amenity bundles. Then,
the bounded reward function U (•) of the Markovian decision process can be constructed
by f/: S XA ^ ^ where U{s^j) = Uj (^^) forj g A. The objective of the migrant can
be restated as a migration strategy, or a sequence of action <J(5(/)) e A, to maximize the
expeaed discounted total reward
(2)
/ = I
where the state of information 5(0 evolves according to the stochastic transition ,lavv
P(-1 5(/-1), 1))) in time for 2,3,4,5. • .r
We assume the individual has fiill information about his/her home country, but is
only partially informed about the real wage and amenities in.a potential host countiy.
Since a potential migrant can become better informed only by spending some time living
there, assume represents the potential migrant's pre-immigration information state for
host country attributes at the beginning of the first period, but he/she does have his/her
own personal subjective probability distribution aboutMy andXf. The migrant is assumed
to be completely informed about his wage prospects in the host country after living there
one period and about amenities in the host country after living there two periods. We
assumethat the migrant only cares about the wage rate.during the second period of
residence in the host country. After heworks for one period, he is then concerned about
amenities and the realwage rate. Denotek]^R+, which is assumed to be known to the
agent, as the costof moving from country / to countryj. ^/and h aregenerally different,
because ^/contains the search cost andthe imving cost, but h only includes the moving
cost There are constant probabilitiesph and /?/, known tothe potential migrant, ofbeing
unemployed inthe home country and the host country, respectively, in the fourth period.
To simplify the model, we assume there is at most one cycle ofmigrating moves, i.e., ifa
migrant returns to his home country, he cannot migrate again.
With this model structure, the state spaces for the home country and host country
can be regarded as the subsets:
S" ^(R^xR)kjR, and
c XJ?) u R
The implication is the state of information forthehome country willbe {wh, Xh) e /?+ x i?
until the last period when it reduces toXh g R. Moreover, if he decides to stayin the
homecountryat the beginning of the first period, his state of information for the potential
host countrywill be frozen at . However, if he decides to migrate to the host country
at the beginning of the first period, the state of information for the host country will
change from to "Viy€ i?+, and then, the state of informationwill change from yvf e R+
to (w/, X/) e J?+ Xi?, provided he decides to stay one more period in the host country.
After the agent retires, his relevant state of information reduces to XfG R. Furthermore,
the time-dependent action space for the potential migrant can be described as:
4 ={Kf),
{//} when s(t) e
{h, f} when s{t) .e S-^
A. = for t = 2,3,4,5
and his per period utility function Uj \ ^R for countryj with the state of information
s'{t) are
Uf{s\t)) = J
and
-kf
Wf
Wf-^Xf
Wh + Xh
Xh
for ^ = 1
for ? = 2
for ?= 3, 4
for / = 5
for^=l, 2, 3,4
for/= 5.
If themigrant re-migrates to his home country at the beginning ofperiod t, then his utility
function at the beginning of period / in the home country isWh+Xh- kh (orXh - Aft).
The Optimal Migration Strategy
What is the optimalmigration strategyfor the potential migrant? The individual
at each decision time point choosesthe country which provides the larger expected
presented valueof remaining life-time utility. Theoptimal location is found by solving
for the final period and working backward, i.e., first solve the re-migration problem at the
beginning of period ^+ 1, and based on this solution solve the re-migration problem at the
beginning ofperiod t?
Because an individual can only migrate to the host country during the first period,
we will only consider the re-migration behaviorfor the last four periods. Denote v{ and
V^t to bethemigrant's life-time utility intheforeign country and the home country in
period t, respectively. Re-migration is the optimal strategyat the beginning of period t if
and only if
RMi = Vl-V{>0 for/ =2,3,4,5 (3)
is satisfied. Therefore, RMt canbe interpreted as the net benefit from re-migration in
period /, givenmigration in the first period. Similarly, migration is an optimal choiceat
the beginning of the first period if and only if
M, = V/ -V,' > 0 (4)
is satisfied. Hence, Mj is the net benefit fi-om migration in the first period. To complete
the description ofthe potential migrant's strategy, solve for = /?,/and /= 1, 2,..., 5.
Since the individual is forced to retire at the beginning ofthe fifth period, the key
factor influencing his well-being is local amenities, i.e..
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F," = (x'-k.l and
V/ = X,.
Because the migrant faces the uncertaintyofbeing unemployed in the fourth
period, his presented value of remaining life-time utility for both countries at the
beginning of the fourth period can be written as:
+^/)+^niax{)c, -k^, Xj.}
x, +p{x,-k,) +p{-m,y
+^r)+ P{xk - k,) +fi{- RM,y
V/
if unemployed
otherwise
if unemployed
otherwise
K =[(i - P/Vft +Xfc - aJ +px^ •
Define to be max{X, 0}. The max{xfr - h, Xf) in V4 captures the fact that the
individual can stay or re-migrate in the next period if he decides to live in the host
country in the current period.
At the beginning of the third period, the migrant knows the amenities xf^ he has all
relevant information about the host country. The expected life-time utility at the
beginning of the third period is;
v{ =(w/+x/)+^[(l -;?/•) [(My+j>) +y3max {xH-h,Xf}]
+/7/max {x/+pmax {xa - x/), vi }] and (9)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
Xh -kh) + P[{l-ph)^h + Xh] + Xh, (10)
where represents the lifetime utility from period 3 onwards to a return migrant who
will stay in the home country for the restof his/her life. On the other hand, v{
represents the value when the migrant decides not to return home. Theoretically, there
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exists a reservation quality of life, which is determined by F? = >such that the
individual will re-migrate if .
If the migrant re-migratesat the beginning of the fourth period, he must retire in
his home country. However, if he decides to stay in the host country in the fourth period,
he has a choice to stay or to re-migrate in the next period.- It can be shown, however, that
re-migration is not a rational strategy at-the beginning of the fourth period,' if he does not
suffer an unanticipated layoff-' The reason is that'the migrant knows all relevant
information at the beginning of the third period, and hence, ifthe host country can
provide a larger remaining life-time utility, it should also provide a larger remaining life
time utility in the fourth period, provided he is not unemployed.
Proposition 1. The immigrant will stay in the host country during thefourth period (the
year before retirement) ifhe is not unemployed, provided he has lived in the host country
during the thirdperiod (previousyear). (SeeAppendix A for prooQ.
According to proposition 1, the individual will re-migrate at the beginningof the
fourth period if and only if he suffers a layoffand - [xf+ -h) + > 0,
since - [(>*y+ x/) + is always negative. Therefore, the net
value ofre-migration inthe fourth period (the year before retirement) isdefined by
RM^ = F/ - [Xf+ p {XH -kh)-^P (11)
r « i i ' • * *
Note that although the individual isunemployed, he may not re-migrate because thehost
country provides a higher remaining life-time utility. Thus, the model describes why
f ' 'j- '
some migrants choose to stay in a host country when they are unemployed but others
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decide to return home. The migrant's life-timeutility in the foreign country in period 3
(equation (9)) can be written as:
v( =<:^f+Xf) + [(Vf/+ Xf) +P{XH- h) +p + Pf + Pf \.
The individual only has the information about the wage rate iv/and his own
personal subjective distribution function ofx/at the beginning of the second period.
Denote G(x/) as the migrant's subjective cumulative distribution function ofx/given Wf.
Define the expected remaining lifetime utility at the beginning of the second period by
Vi = P fmax lV3,V{} dG(xf)
•A
= My+ pVj P t/Gfx/), and (12)
= (wf, +Xf,- kh) +P{wh+ Xh) +y?^[(l -ph)Wf, +Xh] +p\ (13)
where max{ V3, V(} in V2 represents the options of the individual living in the host
country in the current period and to stay or return home in the next period. Because of
uncertainty aboutx/and risk neutrality, the mean of max{ K?, V{} represents the future
utility in the host country. Consequently, we can find a reservation wage, w'j. which is
determined by vl such that the individual will return home if m* ^ ^.
Therefore, some migrants return home because the wage rate and/or amenities in the host
country are too low.
Finally, the potential migrant has no information about the potential host country
at the beginning of the first period, except his own personal subjective distribution
fonctions ofw^^and Xf. Define F{wf) to be conditional distribution function of"wygiven
si. Hence, V\ and v{ are given by
13
V{ ^ max{K5, Ff
=-kf+ j3V\+ p\ {-RM^y dF(wf), and (14)
JR+
v", =^P' <^h +Xh) + [(1 -Ph)y>h +Xj +pW (15)
f=0
Equations (14) and (15) are similar equations to (12) and (13) except max{ ^5, Vi\
illustrates options to a potential migrant if he migrates in the first period. The mean of
max{ y{} represents the future life time utility in the host country.
Overall, the conceptualmodel leads to somestrong conclusions about migration
and re-migration behavior. Given utility maximizingbehavior over a five-period lifetime
with retirement at start of the last period, an individual will migrate in the first period or
never move, and given that he migrates, he will most likely return home at the start of the
fifth or retirement period. Return migration during the second through fourth periods is
unlikely, unless he experiences unanticipated unemployment in the host country, adverse
wage outcomes in the host country, or positivewage information from the home country.
Comparative Static Results
If the potential migrant is at thebeginning of the decision process, his optimal
migration strategy can be summarized by themigration decision treein figure 1. The H
arid F represent a decision to live in the hoirie country (H) orthe host country (F) in
period He will return home ifthe net value ofthis move is greater than zero, given that
once the migrant has returned tohis home country, he cannot migrate again. For
analytical convenience, we assume that A/i ^ 0andM/t 0for /=2, 3, 4, 5.
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The net present valueof themigration decision is increasing inph,Mw, or but
decreasing inp/, h, kfi Wh, or Xh where dF(w^) and //x = Xj-dG{xj-) arethe
expected wage rate and amenity values, respectively. These results are intuitively
reasonable.
For an increase in moving cost kh or kf, the host country should become less
attractive because the expenditure on migration goes up, but an increase in or f^x, or
decrease inpf will inflate the expected life-time utility of the host country residency at
the beginning ofthe first period. Moreover, the expected life-time utility of living in the
home country at the beginning of the first period will decline when ph increases (home
unemployment rate), Wh decreases, orx;, decreases. The table also shows that the net
value of re-migration is decreasing inph, h, or//x, but increasing in/7/(host
unemployment rate), Wh, or Xh. These results seem also to be intuitively plausible. When
fix increases orpf decreases, the expected life-timeutility from being in the host country
at the beginning ofperiod t increases, but ifph or kh increases, the expected life-time
utility of the home country at the beginning ofperiod t decreases. The same argument
can also be applied to w'j- and .
Proposition 2, Part a. Thereservation wage is an increasingfunction ofXh, Wh, or
pf, but a decreasingfunction ofkh^ phy or fix-
Part b. The reservation quality oflife x'^ isan increasingfunction ofXh, Wh, or
Pf, while a decreasingfunction ofkh, or ph. {See AppendixAfor proof)
45
The Empirical Analysis
Migration has received considerable attention by economistsfor more than three
decades, but much less is laiown empirically about the determinants ofreturn migration,
where a migrant returns home after spending some time in a host country—a type of
conditional behavior. Hence, the focus of our empirical research is on testing predictions
obtained from the behavioral model where an individual makes a series of sequential
decisions on location, leading to conditional statements about migration and return
migration, given migration.'^ Econometric methods based ontime-dependent hazard
I. ' • '
functions provide a natural approach to the analysis ofdata on return migration.
The Empirical Model -
During anygiven time interval a migrant has someprobability of returning home,
and a hazard rate representation of the probability of returning home is one particular
representation of this probability. Define T astheduration or length of a completed spell
of migration in a host country with associated c.d.f ofF(t) andp.d.f of where t is a
realization of T. Then the migrant's hazard rate for return migration can berepresented
as the limiting probability that amigration'spell iscompleted in t, given that the migrant
has stayed in the host country until time
h \-F{t) 5(0 ^ ^
where-^(0 is the individual's return migration rate at and S{t) =Pr(T >t) is the
migrant's survival function in the host country, expressing the probability that'a
migration spellds oflength.at,least t (Greene 2000, pp. 939; Kiefer'1988).
In purmodel, wewish to test for effects of a set'ofvariables Xohithe return
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migration hazard rate. A proportional hazard rate model is applied to constructthe
empirical specification. Furthermore, themixed model is used to consider the possible
unobserved heterogeneity in the population ofmigrants. Heterogeneity is assumed to
arise as (i) migrant-specific unmeasured eflFects, e.g., intensity ofpsychic costs ofbeing
away from home and of being in host country, (ii) measurement errorinX, or (iii)
measurement error in the duration of a migration spell in thehost country. Ifwe impose
theWeibull distribution onmigrants' duration (/) in a host country and let V, distributed
as gamma with unit mean and variance 0, represent the migrant-specific unmeasured
heterogeneity, the mixedmigrant survival function is:
={expf- fvA(z, X, p, o-)cfe (v)£A'
wo /
'exp(- v[/ ex^(-X'l3)Y'^ )f^(v)dv =[\ +9]t exp(-X;ff)]^
The associated return migration hazard function is:
^ (/, p, or, 9) = IS^(t,X, p, a, ih.exp(-Xy?)J/<7
-1
. (17)
(18)
(Greene 2000, pp. 946-47).^ In particular, the effect ofunmeasured migrant
heterogeneity is increasing in ^ > 0, but as 0 goes tozero, heterogeneity vanishes.®
Hence, if 9 isnotsignificantly different from zero, thehazard of return migration will be
monotone in duration.
Some of thevariables inXforthe i-ih individual change overtime. If time
dependent covariates are included in the econometric model, thecorresponding hazard
and survivor functions ingeneral do not have a closed-form expression and requires
numerical integration to evaluate it. One oftwo expedients isoften adopted to overcome
•17
this difficuhy: replace covafiates A'(/) by its averagewithin a spell; replaceX{t) by its
value at the beginning ofa spell. However, the first treatment can'have the undesirable
efifectofbuilding in spurious relationships between duration length arid regressors, and
the second treatment ignores the time heterogeneity in the ehvirbrimeht (Heckman and
Singer 1985). Wewill approximatethe hazardfUnction by step-fiinctioris (Petersenl986),
i.e., the time dependent covariates are assumed to be constant within each period, but
may change from one period to the next.'
The Data: Return Migration to Puerto Rico ' >
A large share of re-migration is return migration" (Boijas and Bratsberg 1996), ^d
we propose to test our model ofreturn migration using data ori Pueito Ricans. Puerto
Rico, a Caribbean island located about l,000nules southeastofMiami, Florida, can be
seen as a peripheral country receivinga large influxofcapital from the United States and
beinga country with a transnational migration network to theUnited Statesoperating for
more than three decades. Close political-economic relations, however, have riot erased
historical linguistic, cultural, and income differences. Piierto Rico was colonized by
Spain in the 16'? Century, it remains largdy Spanish speaking, and it has astrong Spanish
flavor to its culture^ In contrast, the United States is English speaking, and the culture is
predominately Northern European. In 1980, per capita-income was 30 percent lower in
Puerto Rico than intheUnited States, furthermore, minimum vy^^age policies have had
very different impacts on the labor force in Puerto Rico than in the United States (see
Castillo-Freeman andFreeman 1992). , r ,
In 1980, 920 thousand native bom Puerto Ricans were residing inthe United
States and 1.5 percent ofPuerto Rico's 3.2 million people were return migrants. The
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return migration flows were relatively stable during the 1970s, ranging from 21,802 to
29,928 persons per year. The return flows grew during the 1980s to more than 35,000 per
year (see table 2), and may have been affected by changing labor conditions in the United
States due to the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, which legalized for work
more than 3 million largely low skilled Spanish speaking workers from Mexico and
Central America.
For this study, a return migrant is defined as a male age 18 to 64 years old in 1990
who was bom in Puerto Rico and has lived/worked in the United States for six or more
consecutive months but had re-migrated from the U.S. mainland during the 1980s. Males
who were in the armed forces, self-employed, or enrolled in school are excluded. The
data are dravsTi from the 1990 5-percent sample of the Public Use Microdata Samples
(PUMS) for Puerto Rico and the United States.
The hazard rate model is applied to migration/working spells in the United States
ofPuerto Rican bom males. Atotal of 12,108 migration/working spells are used in the
empirical analysis ofwhich 2,544 are from the Puerto Rico sample and 9,564 are from
the U.S. sample. The duration of the migration/working spell is defined as:
(ENDAGE-e-ED), (ENDAGE-IS)}
where is the duration recorded in the survey, ED is the individual's years of formal
schooling completed, and ENDAGE is the individual's age in 1990 for the U.S. sample
and the age when the last migration spell was complete for the Puerto Rico sample. After
applying the above definition of the duration of a migration spell, we still have 1,183 left-
censored spells, which are adjusted to complete the sample (see Appendix B for a
discussion).^
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The Empirical Speciflcation
Although thewage at home and intheprospective host country play a central role
in an individual's location decision in our conceptual model, predicted wage rates from
anequation fitted to cross-sectional dataseem fraught with difficulties. Theprimary
reason is theyprovide a snapshot of thewage structure at only onepoint in time. The
coefficients in hedonicwage equations may reasonably be constant, when adjusted for
inflation, over periods modest in length but seemunlikely to be constant over forty years
which is the length oftime spent on the mainland by the Puerto Rican migrant with the
longest duration in our sample. An alternative approach is to consider a hedonic wage
equation and then replace the predicted wage by the set of regressors that are predictors
taking a reduced-form approach. By applying this methodology, we can solve several
problems. There is, however, no free lunch and the price we pay is that we cannot obtain
direct estimates of the impact of the U.S. and Puerto Rican wage rates on the hazard rate
for re-migration.
Prime candidates for regressors in the wage equation are an individual's own.
human capital and local- and birthplace- labormarket conditions. An individual's years
of schooling completed represent.general human capital that is valuable in the labor
market oftheUnited States and Puerto Rico. Castillo-Freeman and Freeman (1992) have
shown that forPuerto Rican bommen, the economic return to schooling in 1970 and
1980 from working inPuerto Rico is higher than fromiworking intheUnited States, and
the gap was increasing during the decade of the 1970s. An individual's education also
affects informationprocessing skills that can reducetransactions costs associatedwith
efficient decisions to relocate (Huffman 1985). Furthermore, Detang-Dessendre and
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Molho (1999, 2000)have shown empirically that an individual having higher levels of
education increase the probability of long distancemigration (but has no effect on short
distance migration). An individual's age is strongly correlated with potential labor
market experience, which generally has a quadraticmarginal effect on an individual's
wage. An individual's age also proxies individual and family life-cycle effects on work,
including retirement, and consumption, and given that human life is finite, an individual's
age is an indicator of expected length ofremaining work life and of life over which
benefits fi"om return migration can be obtained.
An individual's English proficiency is a valuable skill in the U.S. labor market
and being bilingual is a skill of some value in the Puerto Rican labor market. Linguistics
is one part of social capital which can be expected to affect migration and return
migration (see Stevens 1994; Boijas 1994; Dustmann 1999). Individuals who have
greater English proficiency have greater tendency to immigrate to the United States, and
once in the U.S. their proficiencywith English tends to increase (Stevens 1994). For a
migrant, an increase in his English proficiency will increase his U.S. wage rate by more
N.
than his Puerto Rican wage rate. Good health is also human capital (Strauss and Thomas
1998) affecting an individual's wage rates and the quality of life. When an individual is
disabled, his labor productivity is lower, and disability can be expected to reduce the size
of the U.S.-Puerto Ricowage differential. Disability also increasesthe cost of migration,
and it may affect an individual's location preferences because ofdifferences in
entitlements that are associated with living in a particular location.
The job growth rate, unemployment rate, and minimum wage policies ofPuerto
Rico and the United States are also determinants of expectations about the wage rate that
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an individualmight earn in the United States,and .Puertq Rico, respectively. .Following
Topel (1986), a higher expect job grovrth rate,for an area orlower expected,
unemployment rates is associated with a higher expected wage rate for an area, other
things equal. The anticipated effects ofunemployment ^e incorporated into wage
structures, but they have different effectsthan unanticipated unemployment. Castillo-
Freeman and Freeman (1992) have showed that a.major increase of the minimum wage in
Puerto Rico created a marked spike in the ,distribution ofearnings near the minimum .
wage. Also, a high minimum wage has employment effects,-leading to higher ..
unemployment rates in the short run (see Ramos 1992, Castillo-Freeman and Freeman
1992) and substantial loss in employment over the long term (see Reynolds and Gregory
1965; Castillo-Freeman and Freeman 1992). i • - i '
The.symbols used to define the variables in the empirical hazard rate'model are
presented in table 3, and the systematic, part ofthe hazard rate function is:
-X,{typ =A+fi\^GE,(ti)+P2AGESQ,{td-+P,ED,+ P^ENG, +p.DISAB,
+p'PJRUS, (/,)+fi,PURUS,(Q +P,PJRPR,{t,) +p,PURPR, ft)
+P,PBMiN,(t,) +l}„PmikjR,{t,) (19)
where PiJMAfC/R is aninteraction term betweenanAPRMIN.^ ED, ENG, and
DISAB take on a particular value at the beginning ofamigration spell and are unchanged
over the remainder ofthe spell. AGE, AGESQ, PURUS, PURPR, PJRPR, PURPR,
PRMIN, and PRMINUR vary over time and across (spells) individuals. They take on end
ofmigration spell or 1990 values. The expected sign ofthe coefficients in equation (19)
is: >0^ <0; <0, ^4 >0, >^3 >0, >0, /?, <0, <0, and fin >0. We cannot
directly predict or ^lo since there exists the minimum wage-unemployment interaction
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effect. We canonly expect that boththe real minimum wageandthe unemployment in
PuertoRico have negative effects on the hazard rate for re-migration, evaluated at sample
mean.
Table 3 presents sample mean values of the characteristics ofPuerto Rican
migrants who returned to Puerto Rico during the 1980s (at the time of re-migration) and
for Puerto Rican migrants who remained in the United States in 1990. The returning
migrants were on average younger, less schooled, less proficient in English, and more
likely to be disabled than migrants who remained in the United States. These differences
are rough confirmation ofthe selectivity ofboth migration and return migration.
The Results
The maximum likelihood estimates ofthe coefficients for the empirical return-
migration hazard-rate function fitted to the 12,108 observations onmigration/working
spells are reported in table 4. All of the estimated coefficients are significantly different
from zero, including 0, the heterogeneity parameter. Hence, we conclude that
heterogeneity exists in the return-migrationhazard function. When the predicted hazard
rate, evaluated at the samplemean, is graphed against duration, the relationship is an
inverted U (figure 2, part b), or concave durationdependent. The maximum hazard rate
for re-migration (0.8%) occurs when a Puerto Rico-bom man has lived/worked in the
United States for 3.75 years. Thereafter, the hazard-rate declines for additional duration.
This graph suggests that migration is generally a success in the sense that individuals tend
to stay for a significant length oftime in the host country before feeling a strong
unmeasured pull to return home. This is long enough to capture some positive benefits
on the initial migration costs associated with moving from Puerto Rico to the United
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States. In contrast, if homogeneity were imposed[ the implication is the highest
probability of retuming'home occurs during the first year, and it decreases as time in the
U.S. accumulates (see figure 2, part a). . ' , •. . • ' •
Our other estimated coefficients provide enlightening new insights on
determinants ofreturn migration. The concave effect of a migrant's AGE on expected
duration in the United States implies that duration increases with his age up to 28, but for
an individual who is older than 28 years; duration decreases with age. Thus, when a .•
Puerto Ricanjs younger than 28 years, the conditional probability of him returning home
decreases with each birthday. After he turns 28 years, the probability ofreturn migration
increases with each birthday, increasing rapidly during the 40s and 50s and becoming
relatively large for an.individual who is60 years ofage (see figure 3).^° Reagan and •
Olsen (2000) obtained somewhat similar results.
The strongly convex rdationship betweenthe hazard rate for return migration and
themigrant's age is inconsistent with inter-countiywagedifferences beingthe major
factor drivingiretum migration. The effect is, however, consistent with finite life and a
dramatic change in consumption bundle in retirement where home-country amenities
weighing heavily onlocation decisions. We suggest these results'provide strong
empirical evidence for thepredictions from the behavioral model developed inthe
previous section. The results are also consistent with conclusions in Tienda andWilson
(1992) and Pissarides and Wadsworth (1989)., .
Increasing an individual's schooling by one year reduces by 4.5 percent the
duration ofaPuerto Ricp-bpm male's migration spell in the United. States and increases
his probability ofreturn migration. TKis result supports Castillo-Freeman and Freeman's
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(1992) finding for Puerto Rico-bom-men that the economic return to schooling in Puerto
Rico is higher than in the United States, and given this information, it also supports
predictions from our conceptual model when the wage in the home country rises relative
to wage in the host country. It also supports schooling reducing transactions costs
associated with long-distance migration (Detang-Dessendre and Molho 1999), and
Ramos' (1992) finding that native bom Puerto Ricans who migrate and return to Puerto
Rico.tend to be more skilled than those who remain in the United States. •
An individual's English proficiency plays a significant role in return migration
decisions for. Puerto Rico-bom men. GreaterEnglish proficiency increases a migrants
time m the United States (because it increases the wage rate in the US. by more than it
increases the wage rate in Puerto Rico) and reduces his hazard-rate for retum migration.
Duration in the United States for Puerto Rico-bommales having English proficiency is
2.22 times longer than for those with poor English proficiency. This'empirical result
supports the prediction from our conceptualmodel that an increase in the U.S. wage
relative to Puerto Rican wage reduces the hazard rate for retum migration. It also
supports the hypothesis that language proficiency is an-important form of country-
specific human capital affecting re-migration rates (Chiswick and Miller 1993;Regan and
Olsen.2000- Dustmann 1999).
The results suggest that that a migrant's disability lengthens his duration in the
United States by about 18.3 percent, and reduces his h^ard rate for return migration.
Overall, the result supports the prediction that disability raises the cost.or/ahd reduces the
benefit to return migration. It is also consistent with better entitlement programs for
disabled individuals in the United States than in Puerto Rico. The coefficient, however, is
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significantly differentfrom zero onlyat the 10 percent significance level.
The empirical results yield strong evidence for the effect of labor market
conditions on re-migrationdecisions. A 0.1 percentage point increase in.the predicted
U.S. job growth rate, v^hich increases the migrant's expected U.S. wage rate, lengthens
the migration spell in theiUnited States by 28 percent, and thereby reducing his hazard
rate for return migration. A similar increase in the predicted job growth rate for Puerto
Rico, which increases the migrant^s expected wage rate ifhe should retums.home, .
reduces his duration in the United States by 40 percent and increases his haz^d rate for
return migration. These results support .predictions from our beha.vioral model about host
and home country wage effects on the,retum.migration decision. .
,. The empirical results show that a 0.1 percentage point increase in the predicted
U.S. unemployment rate reduces by about ,9 percent;the duration ofmigration tothe.
United States, and increases the hazard rate for returnmigration.' The;proportional effect
of the predictedPuerto Rican unemployment rate on migrant's time in the U.S. is
p9 + fiu^RMIN. Whenwe evaluate this effect at the sample meanofPRMINforl980
and 1990, we obtain 4.163. Hence, a one-percentage point increase in thepredicted
unemployment rate forPuerto Rico lengthens themigration spell by 4^1 percent and
reduces the hazard rate for return migration. Similarly, a proportional increase of the real
minimum wage inPuerto Rico impacts the length ofthe U.S. spell duration as
Pxo+ P^^PURPR. At the mean ofPC/i^Pi? from 1980 to1990, which is'18.636, the
results show that a 10'cents increase in the Puerto Rican real minimum wage lengthens
theU.S. migration spell by 19.7 percent and ^Mecreases thehazard rate for return
migi*ation. The estimate of^n which is the coefficient ofthe interaction term between
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thePuerto lUcari predicted unemployment rate and real minimum wage, is positive.
Giventhat the ekimates of andpw are negative, this interaction effect has a
moderating effect.
Conclusions and Implications
' Return migration frequently occurs at the time an individual'rtoes from the labor
force. Theoretical models of location, including migration and re-migratiori, and '
empirical analyses of these events have infrequently incorporated theeffects of finite life
and retirement with its dramatic change in the consumption bundle. In contrast, this
paper has presented a conceptual modd ofan individual's multi-period lifetime utility
maximizing location decisions where home and host locations are heterogeneous in
amenities and retirement occurs at the beginning of the final (fifth) period. We obtained
the prediction that an individual will migrate in the first (adult) period or never migrate,
and given he migrates, he is most likely to return home at the start of the final or
retirement period. Return migration at other times is unplanned hwX may be optimal
when economic shocks change host and home country real wage opportunities and
employment prospects.
Empirical evidence was presented in a hazard rate analysis of return migration for
Puerto Rico-bom males who worked in the Untied States during the 1980s. The
empirical evidencewas consistentwith the predictions of the behavioralmodel—
improved host labor market conditions reduced the hazardof return and improvedhome
country labor market conditions increased the hazard of return. Also, the strongly
concave relationship between the hazard of return and the migrant's age is evidence of
the very important role played by finite life andretirement when home and host locations
;27
differ greatly in culture, language, access to, family, anda comfortable climate. Although
the hazard rate with heterogeneityexhibited concave duration dependents, we concludeit
does not contradict the behavioral model. ' '
The study has major implications'for internal miration. The theoretical model
I I ^
is directly application withoutmodification, provided the homeand prospective host
areas are heterogeneous in location-specific amenities which isrtrue for all large
countries, e.g., United States, Canada, Australia, Europe^ Union, Brazil. The model,
however, seems most applicable where human,'economic, and social mobility are
occurring at not more than a modest rate because this permits local heterogeneity to
maintain considerable persistence over time, e.g., France, Germany, United Kingdom, '
European Union. An individual who migrates at'an early age can return home in
retirement to "familiar" local amenities and not be disappointed. In contrast, if human
geographic,, economic^ and social mobility areoccurring too rapidly overtime,-the unique
attributes of home/originating areas will be changing rapidly. Hence, any homeareawill
losemost of its attractiveness to retiring migrants,' who left the.areaat a young.age,
because there, is "nothing" familiar to return to; e.g.. United States, Br^il..
I
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' B(S) denotes the a -algebra of all Borel subset of S.
^ If an individual decides to stay in his country at the beginning ofthe first period, he
will never migrate in any subsequent period because of the learning cost and finite life
assumptions. Hence, the strongest incentive is for the young to migrate.
^ Ourmodel can also be seenas intertemporal optimization through costly search for the
best location, given finite life and retirement at the beginning ofthe last period. Hence, it
has similarities to the model of optimal job search and employment duration presented by
Mortensen andNeumann (1988), except they assume infinite life and increasing marginal
cost of search.
" Clearly another approach is to model empirically thefirst move, i.e., migration, rather
than re-migration.
^ The hazard function X(t) is obtained from the survival function as X(i) = -dlnS(t)/dt\ so
there is a sign reversal ofcoefficients in going between the survival and hazard functions.
The Weibull distribution is monotone (constant, increasing or decreasing) but
employment duration is generally non-monotonic concave in duration (Lancaster 1990,
pp. 9; Gritz 1993). We permit this patternby adopting a mixture distribution—Weibull
and gamma. An alternative distribution with this pattern is log-logistic (Greene 2000, pp.
940-41; Keifer 1988; Lancaster 1990). All are distributions for a nonnegative random
variable.
®Heterogeneity will arise when a population ofmigrants (migration spells) has
potentially different distributions of duration after controlling for the effects of
observable variables. The gamma distribution is frequently used for representing the
33
distribution of V .associated withunobseryed heterogeneity. Heckman and Singer (1985)
have shown that failure to includeheterogeneity when it is present causesMgriificant bias
in the estimated coefficients of the regressors in the hazard function. Han and Hausman
(1990) have shown that a parametric gamma distribution ofunobserved heterogeneity •.
leads easily to estimable models and is not unduly restrictive.
' SeeHauberg (1974) and Santiago(1992) for more information on Puerto Rico and the
Puerto Rican labor market.
^ An alternative'approach is to ignore left-censored spells, but this,creates measurement
error in duration ofmigration spells (Kiefer 1988).
^PURUSandPURPR in equation (19) proxy anticipated ratherthanunanticipated effects
ofunemployment (see Appendix B for details on construction).
The graph in figure 2(b) is sensitiveto the value of an individual'sage. Because the
sample mean ofeducation is 10.23 years, the individual by assumption beganhisworking
life in theUnited States when hewas 18 years of age. Hence, duration of themigration
spell canbe derived as an individual's ageminus 18. Using this assumption, figure 3
shows that the hazard rate achieves a minimum when he is 28 years old; and thereafter
the hazard rate for re-migration increases as his age increases.
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Table 1. Comparative Static Results for Multi-PeriodFinite Life Utility Maximizing
Model with Retirement: Effects ofph, Pf, h, kfi jUw, /Jx, '^h, and Xfj on the
Net Value ofMigration and Re-migration
Net Values Exogenous Variables^
OfMigration Ph Pf h kf Ax Wh Xh
M} . + - - + + - -
RM2 - + 0 0 - + +
RMs - + 0 0 0 + + '
RM4 - 0 0 0 0 + +
RM. 0 0 0 0 0 0 +
Detailed derivations can be found in AppendixA.
Table 2. Puerto Rico-bom, 5 Years Old and Over; Re-Migrated to Puerto Ricofrom the
United States during the 1970s and1980s' ' • .
Year c Number of years Male Female Total
^ 1970 - 1972 3 ^ 34,404 31,000 65,404
1973 ~ 1974 2 '24,496 ' 22,565 47,061
1975 1 14,652 13,747 28,079
1976-1977 2 27,46o' 26,619 54,079
^ 1978 1 15,176 14,752 29,928
1979-- 1980" 2 , 28,318 • 24,675 52,993
1980- 1982" 3 . 26,831 25^535 52,366
1983
i.
1 9,598 9,348 18,946
1984 1 11,796 10,835 22,631
1985 1 15,718- ,14,738 30,456
1986 1 ' 14,258 • 13,043 27,301
1987 1 17,864 17,773 35,637
1988 1 18,989 17,969 36,958
1989 1 27,858 .24,813 52,671
Source: CensusofPopulation andHousing, 1980and 1990.
"Note that1980 appears twice in this table.
Table 3. Variable Definitions andSampleMeansfor VariablesinAnalysis ofDuration of
Puerto RicO'Born Males Working in the United States during the 1980s
Variables
'1
Description
Sample Mean
Remaining * ' Re-mi^ated Total
T Duration in years working in the
United States
20.28 5.12 12.24
AGE Migrant's age at return (or in 1990
for stayers), in years.
43.29 38.56 42.29
AGESQ Square ofAGE divided by 100. 19.95 16.41 19.20 s.
ED Highest grade of school completed. 10.43 9.44 10.23
ENG 1 ifmigrant reported speaking
English well or very well;
0 otherwise.
0.82 0.49 0.75
DISAB 1 ifmigrant reported a health
condition that limited the kind of
work or amount ofwork he would
do;
0 otherwise.
0.14 0.18 0.15
PJRUS Predicted job growth rates for the
United States.
1.64 1.59 1.63
PURUS Predicted unemployment rates for
the United States.
5.31 7.08 5.68
PJRPR Predicted job growth rates for
Puerto Rico.
1.53 1.78 • 1.59
PURPR Predicted unemployment rates for
Puerto Rico.
14.49 18.53 15.30
n
PRMIN Real minimum wages on Puerto
Rico in 1990 dollars
3.80 4.11 3.86
'*
PRMINUR Interaction, PURPR x PRMIN 55.07 75.77 59.36
Table 4.MaximumLikelihoodEstimates oftheHazardFunctionfor Return Migration of
Puerto Rico-Bom Males Working in the UnitedStates.during the 1980s, 1990 Census
MicrO'Data
Explanatory
Variables
Without Heterogeneity
Coefficients • Marginal Effect
(t-value)
ofRe-Migratibn
With Heterogeneity
Coefficients Marginal Effect
, s On Hazard Rate
- • ofRe-Migration
Intercept 59.178 (11.46) 58.701 (12.71)
AGE 0.140 (7.45) 0.028" 0.098
i
(4.67) 0.055"
AGESQ -0.219 (-9.44) - -0.177 (-6.30)
ED -0.034 (-3.52) 0.021 -0.045 (-4.59) 0.048
ENG 2.-202 (24.17) -1.357 2.215 (24.08) -2.351
DISAB 0.118 (1.29) -0.073 0.183 (1.76) -0.194
PJRUS 2.498 (15.35) -1.539 2.803 (19.24) -2.976
PURUS' -0.614 (-10.37) • 0.378 -0.863 (-13.83) 0.916
PJRPR -3.747 (-12.63) 2.309 -4.004 (-16.37) 4.251
PURPR -2.973 (-9.59) -0.018^
1
-3.092 (-11.09) -0.041'
PRMIN -12.489 (-9.39) -0.584" -12.103 (-10.42) -2.092'
PRMINUR 0.721 (8.75) 0.752 (10.30)
cr 1.623 (32.25) 0.942 (23.95)
e 1.984 (13.25)
Total Spells 12,108 12,108
"Evaluated atthe sample mean ofAGE, 42.295.
E^valuated at the sample mean ofPRMIN from 1980 to 1990,4.163.
Evaluated atthe sample mean ofPURPR from 1980 to 1990,18.636.
Figure 1. MigrationDecision Tree:Five-PeriodModelwithRetirement
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Appendix A, proof
Proof ofProposition 1:
We want to show that
{fVf+Xf)+fircax^^-k^,xj] >^-p^)w^+x^-k^]+px^ = Vj" (Al)
Suppose thatit is hot true. Then, the individual's presented value oflife time utility in
the host countiy at the beginning of the third period is
+Xf)+ PfXf\+ - k^, Xf\ }
= +jpmax{(l -
< (vfy +Xy.) +^max{(M'^ +x^) +yffmaxixj - V^]
= {^f+^f)+PK-
)Wj. + +yffmax{xjx^} V!;]
(A2)
The individual'spresented value oflife time utilityfor re-migration at the beginning.of
the thirdperiod is
(w, + X, - ArJ + ^[((l - p,)w, +xj + yffxj
= lw,+x,-{l-M+ fiV:.
However, according to the fact, >?max{xj x^} > -k^) ,we have
(l - /'iVfc + - (l - P)K >y«,+x
1.
2.
f . > 0)k^ >-Wj.+x^.
This implies that equation (A3) is greaterthanequation (A2), violating the assumption
that the individual has lived in the host country duringthe third period.
Derivation of Comparative Statistics i
The net value of re-migration at the beginning of the fifth period is defined as:
RM, = = {x,~k,)-x,, (A4)
Taking derivative ofRMs with-respect to4 and xa, '
dRM,
dk.
= -1 < 0 and
h .
It is clear that Wh^ kf, fix, /Uw, Ph^ or/?/has no impact on Hence, the derivatives
ofiiMs with respect to these parameters are zero.
the fourth period is vwitten as;The net valueof re-migration at the beginning o
= F/ - [x^ +y?(x, - Aj+y9(- KM, f
Taking derivative ofW4 with respect to kh, ph, Wh, and Xh,
dk.
(-)
dL
(+)
dRM,
^ -w, < 0
dRM5 _
dx.
= 1 > 0.
(A5)
dm,
dw^
= ^-Ph > 0
SUM, ^ ^ ^ ^
dx. chc.
(-)
Because kf, ^x, ^w, or pf dose not affectRM^, the derivatives of with respect to
these parameters are zero.
3. The net value of re-migration at the beginning of the third period is:
-^f+Xf)+p\l-p^)\w^+Xj)+p{x^-k^)+l3{-RM^)*
+PfK + .} (A6)
Taking derivative oiRM-i with respect toph, h, Pf, Xh, and Wh,
oPh opt, dpf,
(-)
( = 0) (+)
dm,
dk. ' — ' ok. dku
( <1)
dm. = +x^)+^max{x^
(^) fj
-^maxfxTj. +>9max{x, ~k^,Xj-\v^]>0
dp
/
{>vb by Proposition!)
^ ' dx. dx.
dm,
dw^
i*)
=l+fiil~p,^-pf)-fip/^ >0.
dwj
(-)
(+)
(-)
Since kf, fix, or dose not appear in RM-i, the derivatives ofRM-i with respect to
these parameters are zero.
4. Thenetvalue of re-migration at thebeginning of thesecond period is defined as:
RM^ =w, +x,+(fi-\)k^-w^-p\^(-m,ydG{,x^). (A7)
Taking derivative ofm2 with respect toh, Xh, Why Pf, and ph.
=Cg-l)-/gf/^ <0dm,
dk.
dm,
dx^.
= i-y?
dk
d{-RM,y
" Sx„
dG(Xf) > 0
A.
dRM
dw,
2 _
= l-yff
d{-RM,y
dG{Xf) > 0
^ dw,
(-)
d{-RM,ydRM,
dpf
= -P
JR
dRM.
2 _
dp,
= -P
(-)
1- d{-RM,y
^Pk
P) '
dG{xj) > 0
dG{Xf) < 0
Let v = Xj.-^^ with distribution fiinction G^(v). Note that .G^(v) does not
dependent on fix andXf~ v+ //,; Taking derivative ofRMj withrespect to //x,
dRM,
dft^
= -P
^ dx.
{^) (= 1)
Because kf or fiw does not appear in RM2, the derivatives of RM2 with respect to
these two parameters are zero.
5. The net valueof emigration at the beginning of the first periodis written as:
M, = V/ -v," = -k^ + +v(\dF{wy)-v,'
=-kf +4, (- RM,YdF(w^) - {w, +X,) - Pk,
Taking derivative ofM with respect to kf, kh, Xh, Wh, ph, ph, and fix.
1 ^
dk^ = 4.
= p
dV/
d{RM,y ^dV{
dk, dki,
dF(Wj.) - < 0
d{RM,y dV/)d{RM.^y
dk. dk. dk
dG(xA
h )
dFiy^f) - p < 0
(-) (-) '•
T)
dk,
T)
^ = p
ex,
DM,
dw.
=
s(-w,y ,
< 0
' PT '
d{-RM^Y
dw.
dF(yv^) - 1 < 0
h .
Vi
(-)
< 0.
(A8)
dM,
^Ph
+
II
5(- RM^)
SPh
(1\
dM,
dpf
II
»*
+
9(- iiMj)
SPf
-—n—
dM\
\ )
di-RM^)
(^)
dFiWf) > 0
dF(Wj^) < 0
dF{Wj.) > 0
Let u = Wy - with distribution function (w). Note that (w) does not
dependenton //«, andWf= u + //w. Taking derivative ofMi with respect to /iw,
d{-RM^Ydw^
dwj.
' ?) ' (= 1)
dF^{u) > 0.
Proof of Proposition 2:
The reservation amenity x*j. in the foreign country is defined such that RM-s = 0.
By the implicit function theorem,
dRMJdadx'f
da dmjdx'f •
Taking derivative wdth respect to
dx.
(-)
smce both r^=- 1 and
dx} dx}
-\~P
dx\
(+)
d{-BM^y
dx^
dx
/
(•^)
are negative.
(A9)
< 0
The reservation wage w} is the wage rate in the foreign country such that BMa =
0. Based on the implicit function theorem,
dm^jdbdw}
"db ~dRMjdw'j. '
Taking derivative ofRM2 with respect to w'^
d{-RM,y . . . dRM,
dwj.
(AlO)
dG(Xj-) < 0, since ^ =- 1- y?(l - pj) <0.
dw dw.
(^)
Combining with the results ofcomparative statistics, we have the desired results.
Appendix B, Data
.' -j.
Fixing Left-Censored Spells/ Awell specified time dependent hazard model
requires that duration or all working spells be either completed or right-censored
Unfortunately, ourdatadrawn from thePUMS forPuerto Rico and for theU.S. contain
2,111 left-censored spells. One option is to measure the left-censored spell fi-om the first
date that data are available. This, however, introduces measurement error into duration
(Kiefer 1988). Although option is to fit anequation to entry date for completed spells
anduse predictions fromthis equation to complete the information needed to remove left-
censofed spells.
We implement the second option. In doing this, we allow for possible non-
randoni selection in completed (or left-censored) spells. However, when the natural
*^1 I '
logarithm of spells is the dependent variable, two potential problems arise. First, direct
application ofHeckman's selection procedure (Heckman 1979) requires the natural
logarithm of duration to be distributed normally, but we assumed that completed duration
is a family of two-parameter Weibull distribution in the time-dependent hazard model.
Hence, some conflicts arise because we have inconsistent assumptions about the
distributional assumption underlying completed duration. Second, ifwe fit duration or
entry age to a set ofexogenous variables and use predicted duration to fill in for missing
entry ageML estimates for hazard fate models using some ofthe same exogenous
variables as regressor tends to overestimate the contribution ofthese variables. However,
if we use a new set of exogenous variables to explain entryage/started working, we can
circumvent this problem because we can uniquely identify theyear ofentry for all
individuals with left censored spells.
We have 808 left-censored spells in thePuertoRico sample and 375 left-censored
spells in theU.S. sample. Hence, there are 1,285 spells of unknown length outof a total
of 12,108 spells. Since ourdata come from two different populations, wefit regressions
for entry age/started working to the two samples separately. For the Puerto Rico sample,
there are 808 left-censored out of2,544 total spells. Hence, a 68.24-percent sample is
used in fitting the entry age/started working equation to the Puerto Rico sample having
nonrleft-censored spells.
We first fit a binary probit model tothe 2,544 spells where the dependent variable
isa 1 if a Puerto Rico-bora male working in the United States for more than 10 years (i.e.,
left-censored spells in the Puerto Rican sample arise only for those individuals who
worked in the U.S. more than 10 years) and 0 otherwise. The explanatory variables
contain personal characteristics and local characteristics. The detailed variable definition
used in the probit model and the fitted equation are displayed in table Bl.
We construct the inverse Mill's ratio for non-random selection fi-om the above fitted
probitmodel. These values are saved for the completed spells. Then, we regress the
natural logarithm of an individuals' entry/starting-age for a U.S. working spell on the set
of exogenous regressors andthe inverse Mill's ratio. The resultingestimates should be
unbiased for the population of all spells. The instrumental variable estimate of the log
entry-age equation is reported in table B2. Then, we predict the starting-age for an
individual's U.S. working spells for those migrants having left-censored spells (excluding
the inverse Mill's ratio) and complete the data set on duration for thePuerto Rico sample.
Afinal adjustment ismade to insure predicted age at initial employment is not less than
18 years.
Asimilar procedure is applied to fix left-censored spells in theU.S. sample. Here
there are375 left-censored spells outof 9,574, i.e., a 96.1-percent sample is used in
fitting the entry-age equation to observations having non-left-censored spells. The only
difference between themissing data problem in the Puerto Rico and U.S. samples is that
the qualitative dependent variable for the probit model takes a value of 1 when a Puerto
Rico-bom men worked in theUnited States more than 40years, and 0 otherwise, because
the left-censored spells arise only for individualswho have lived/worked in the United
States for more than 40 years.
Table Bl. Variable Definition
Variables
AGE
AGE'
AGE'
AGE^
ED
ED'
ENG
EDENG
DISAB
RACE
PUSEM
PUSUN
PPREM
PPRUN
PRMIN
PRMINXJN
RUSEM
RUSUN
RPREM
RPRUN
A
X
Definition
Migrants's ageat.end ofU.S. migration/working spell, in years.
ageVioo. '
ageViooo.
ageVioooo.
Highest grade of school completed.
ED'/IOO.
1 if migrant reported speaking English well or very well; 0 otherwise.
Interaction, ED x ENG
1 ifmigrant reported a health condition that limited the kind ofwork or
amount ofwork he could do; 0 otherwise.
1 ifwhite; 0 otherwise.
Predicted job growth rates for United States.
Predicted unemployment rates for United States.
; Predicted job growth rates for Puerto Rico.
Predicted unemployment rates for Puerto Rico.
Real minimum wages in Puerto Rico in 1990 dollars.
Interaction, PPRUN x PRMIN.
Residual ofjob growth rates for the United States.
Residual ofunemployment rates for the United States.
Residual ofjob growth rates for Puerto Rico.
Residual ofunemployment rates for Puerto Rico.
Inverse Mill's ratio.
Table B2 Estimated Coefficients ofBinary ProbitforLength ofWorkStatus (1 vs.O) in the U.S.
Covariates
Puerto Rico Sample U.S. Sample
Probit Model" Regression Model'' Probit Model" Regression Model ^
INTERCEPT -53.381++* 6.560*** 2795.617*+* ^.435+++
(-4.88) (11.59) (5.38) (-^.33)
AGE 4.494*** -292.798***
(4.32) (-5.38)
AGE' -14.112*** 986.201***
(-3.89) (5.35)
AGE' 1.936*** -136.554***
(3.53) (-5.32)
AGE'' -0.098*** 6.762***
(-3.20) (5.29)
ED 0.059** -0.019**+ 0.146*** -0.039+++
(2.10) (-6.19) (3.96) (-21.39)
ED^ -0.559*** 0.123*** -0.961*** 0.213***
(-3.20) (7.21) (-4.33) (22.01)
ENG 1.142*** -0.732*** 0.284 -0.072***
(6.69) (-29.70) (1.33) (-5.38)
EDENG -0.055*** 0.047*** 0.018 0.001
(-2.96) (22.03) (0.62) (0.47)
DISAB 0.133* -0.035*** -0.047 0.072***
(1.79) (-3.76) (-0.54) * (11.78)
RACE 0.272*** 0.010**
(3.33) (2.52)
PUSEM -0.234+++ -0.698***
(-7.84) (-7.13)
PUSUN -0.141*** 0.110**
(-6.06) (2.19)
PPREM 0.085** 0.822***
(2.35) (10.17)
PPRUN -0.143*** 0.426***
(-4.37) (9.02)
PRMIN -3.412*** 7.7S7***
(-5.57) (10.62)
PRMDSTUN 0.211*** -0.486***
• (5.34) (-10.12)
RUSEM -0.079*** -0.038**
(^.35) (-2.48)
RUSUN -0.205*** -0.054
(-5.58) (-0.69)
RPREM 0.010* -0.274***
(1.80) (-18.52)
RPRUN 0.050*** -0.491***
(4.48) (-12.03)
A
A
1.028*** 0.712***
(90.65) (48.26)
Adjust R^ 0.8568 0.4340
"The dependent variable isthe dummy variable with the value equal tol ifPuerto Rico -bommales
worked in theUnitedStatesmore than 10(40)yearsin thePuerto Rico (U.S.) sample; 0 otherwise.
•^ The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the starting-age for amigration/working spell.
* P-value <0.1, ** P-value < 0.05, ♦** P-value < 0.01.
Employment growth rate and annual unemployment rate for U.S. and Puerto
Rico. We model the amiual employment growth rate and the annual unemployment rate
for both the U.S. and Puerto Rico as weakly stationary, time-invariant autoregressive
processes. In other words, the stochastic process with constant mean fj., say the
U.S. annual unemployment rate, is assumed to be generated by
(Bl) (y, -//) = (Zi,(y,_, -//) + (^2(yt-2 + + (yt-p -+"r
where is white noise with zero meanand finitevariance cr„, and the roots of
1- (p^z - = 0 are outside the unit circle. Then, the predicted values are
constructed by the one-step-ahead predicted values. The parameters in equation (Bl) are
estimated by the maximum likelihood method, using annual data for 1945-93 for the
U.S. and 1950-93 for Puerto Rico.' Furthermore, the order of these AR processes is
chosen by minimizing the Akaike information criterion (AIC).
Table B3 summarizes the data and results for the AR models of these four series:
U.S. employment growth rate, Puerto Rican employment growth rate, U.S.
unemployment rate, and Puerto Rican unemployment rate. The job growth rate for the
U.S. and the unemployment rate for Puerto Rico are best represented by an AR process of
order 2, while the other two series are best represented by an AR process of order 1.
Table B3. SummaryofARmodelsfor theAnnualEmployment Growth Rate and the
Annual UnemploymentRate: UnitedStates andPuerto Rico
Mean Order
Job growth rate
For United States" 1.6975 2 0.2280 -0.2604
Unemployment rate
For United States" 5.5837 1 0.9783
Job growth rate
For PuertoRico' 1-^238 1 0.1081
Unemployment rate
For Puerto Rico^ 15.2128 2 1.2726 -0.2792
Contain the annual data for 1945-1993.
^Contain theannual data for1950-1993.
' Thedata inPuerto Ricoare notavailable for 1941-1949.
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